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abstract
This paper argues how an increase in minimum wage aects employment, con-
sumption, and social welfare with dynamic general equilibrium model without mar-
ket frictions. The study demonstrates that a minimum wage hike reduces an ac-
tual unemployment rate and has positive eects on an employment rate under the
demand-shortage economy whereas they do not under a non-demand shortage econ-
omy. The study also shows that optimal minimum wage which maximize social
welfare and minimize an actual unemployment rate when the economy faces the
demand-shortage initially. These ndings imply that the minimum wage can be
considered as one of the eective policy for overcoming deation and stagnation
although it increases the natural rate of unemployment.
KEYWORDS: Minimum wage, Unemployment, Natural rate of unemployment, De-
ation, Stagnation, Demand shortage, Dynamic general equilibrium model
JEL Classication Codes: E24 E31 J38
1 Introduction
The model of the competitive labor market states that a decline in minimum wage
(above competitive wage) increases the employment, rm's prots, and welfare and
thus vitalizes the economy. During the depression period, however, this eects do not
seem to work well because a decrease in aggregate demand is a signicant factor that
decline an employment rate as Keynes (1936) explained. What does macro-economy
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respond when the government increases minimum wage in the stagnation? This paper
argues that the impact of minimum wage policy on the economy diers in response to
the economic situation, and shows that when an economy faces a demand shortage,
an increase in minimum wages improves the employment rate, aggregate consumption,
and social welfare. On the other hand, in an economy that does not face demand
shortage, the increase in wages worsens the employment rate, aggregate consumption,
and social welfare. Trade unions often insist on wage hikes during the labor-management
negotiations, arguing that wage hikes will stimulate the consumption and aggregate
demand. This paper supports these opinions in the context of an sluggish economy but
not of an booming economy.
I develop a simple extension of Ono's (2001) dynamic general equilibrium model with-
out market frictions by building in two dierent types of jobs. In the model economy,
single nal goods are produced by two labor inputs. Firms pay an eciency wage and
a minimum wage for each job. This assumption gives rise to a positive link between
eciency wage and minimum wages that can be used to analyze the eect of a wage
hike (caused by a minimum wage hike) on the economy. This wage setting enables a
tractable analysis because the minimum wage hike leaves the relative wage of each job
unchanged, which eliminates the eect of substitution of labor demand for each job.1
Therefore, the model can focus on the other eects of the minimum wage hike such as
on ination and the budget constraint of households that is unnoticed earlier.
Households have utility from consumption and real balances of money. Assumption
of insatiable marginal utility of money generates two dierent equilibria: a demand-
shortage and a supply-side (non-demand-shortage) economy as Ono (2001) showed. If
the marginal utility of money is insatiable, the households accumulate money more than
enough, and hence, the aggregate consumption level falls short of aggregate output level,
that is, the demand-shortage equilibrium comes out. If the marginal utility of money is
satiable, the supply-side equilibrium shows up. In the analysis, contrasting a demand-
shortage and supply-side economy sheds new light on the function of a minimum wage.
In a demand-shortage economy, the minimum wage hike can prominently increase ag-
gregate consumption, decrease an actual unemployment rate, and improve social welfare.
The reason for this result is attributable primarily to a rm's labor demand function.
When the rm faces the demand-shortage constraint, an equilibrium of underemploy-
ment arises in which the marginal product of labor is higher than the wage. Hence,
higher aggregate demand induces the rms to increase their labor demand and to de-
crease the underemployment as Barro and Grossman (1971) and Honkapohja (1980)
1Cahuc and Michel (1996) state that the minimum wage hike increases the relative wage of unskilled
jobs and induces rms to substitute other jobs including skilled jobs for unskilled jobs.
2
showed.2 At the same time, an increase in the minimum wage narrows the disequilib-
rium gap between demand and supply caused by the stimulation of consumption and
then eases deation. In other words, there is an optimal minimum wage policy that
maximizes social welfare and minimizes an actual unemployment rate when the econ-
omy faces the demand-shortage initially. The analysis also provides a policy implication
for governments concerned about budget decit{that is, a minimum wage hike can raise
the aggregate demand without an increase in government spending.3
On the other hand, in a supply-side (non-demand-shortage economy), a minimum
wage hike decreases the employment and worsens the social welfare in analogy with the
competitive labor market model.
A number of studies are related to this work. As stated above, I use the setting of
Ono's (2001) dynamic general equilibrium model with perfect information. Ono shows
the reasons for the occurrence of liquidity trap and a stagnation, but he does not discuss
the impact of minimum wage.
The minimum wage policy is controversial although its empirical results of employ-
ment eects seem elusive (Manning 2016). Lots of empirical studies analyze the min-
imum wage eects on the employment.4 Several theoretical studies argue the positive
function of minimum wage as opposed to the standard model. The welfare-enhancing
minimum wage policy can be obtained by the intensifying capital accumulation. Cahuc
and Michel (1996) and Fanti and Gori (2011) consider a growth model in which minimum
wage hikes can improve welfare, but for reasons that are dierent from those we consider
here.5 In their model, a minimum wage hike increases savings and capital accumulation
at the cost of increasing unemployment. It then improves economic growth and welfare
under generous unemployment benets and the positive externality of human capital
accumulation that stem from the substituting skilled labor for binding minimum-wage
low-skilled labor. In a context of search model Flinn (2006) shows that minimum wage
2Honkapohja (1980) considers disequilibrium model with endogenous money holdings of household
and shows that the steady state eect of an increase in real government expenditure with the case of
endogenous money holdings is larger than the xed price case with exogenous money holdings.
3Annual ination rate in the euro zone and in Japan are 0.2? and -0.1? in 2016, respectively. It
is also worth considering the minimum wage policy to stimulate the economic activity and to alleviate
the diminishing price pressures.
4For instance, regarding the minimum wage policy eect on low wage employment, Neumark, Salas
and Wascher (2014) conducts a controversy with Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011), and Dube, Lester,
and Reich (2010). Further Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer (2017) oer a counterargument against
Neumark et al. (2014).
5Some studies focus on the relation economic growth and minimum wage. Irmen and Wigger (2006)
consider a two-country overrapping-generations model with capital mobility and endogenous growth,
which shows the condition that minimum wage increases the global economic growth. Meckel (2004)
also considers an endogenous growth model comprising the sectors of nal goods, intermediate goods,
and R&D. This model shows that higher minimum wages for unskilled labor leads to increased growth
and unskilled unemployment, while possibly reducing unemployment of skilled labor. Tamai (2009)
considers a median voter model of heterogeneous households with endogenous growth that determines
the minimum wage by voting. He nds that high inequality has a positive eect on the minimum wage
but generates a non-monotonic relation between inequality and economic growth.
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improves unemployment ineciency and may increase employment considering the size
of the searching participants in response to the minimum wage.6 Furthermore, in the
monopsony model as is well known, a minimum wage hike can increase the employment
and improve the welfare.7 Moreover, Lee and Saez (2012) show the minimum wage hike
becomes the social optimal under competitive labor markets with labor market hetero-
geneity when social welfare function is assumed to value redistribution from high wage
to low wage workers.8 However, none of these studies focus on the optimal minimum
wage policy implemented under demand shortage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the basic setting of
the model. The eects of a minimum wage are analyzed in a supply-side economy in
section 3 and in a demand-shortage economy in section 4. Section 5 discuss the optimal
minimum wage policy. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The model
2.1 Firms
Consider an economy without market frictions in which a representative rm produce
nal goods. Two labor are used in production. One is "high-wage job" which is char-
acterized that workers' eort increase output, and hence the rm pays the eciency
wage for this labor. The other is "low-wage job" characterized that workers' eort is
not response to the output, and hence the rm pays a minimum wage for this labor. I
assume that the minimum wage is regulated and its level is greater than the competitive
wage.9
The concave production function is given by
y = (en1)
a nb2; 0 < a; b < 1; (1)
where y denotes the amounts of output produced and n1 and n2 stand for the number of
employees of high-wage and low-wage job, respectively. e indicates productivity aected
6Acemoglu (2001) constructs a search model in which high and low-wage jobs coexist in response to
capital intensity of each industry and demonstrates that introducing a minimum wage shifts the com-
position of employment toward high-wage jobs, increases average labor productivity, and may improve
welfare.
7Manning (2003) discusses the monopsony in greater detail. Bhaskar and To (1999) construct the
monopsonistic competition, where a large number of employers compete for workers, and are able to
freely enter or exit. A rise in minimum wage raises employment per rm but causes rm's exit due to
the decline of their prot. If the labor market is suciently distorted, the rise in minimum wage raises
aggregate employment and welfare.
8With labor market heterogeneity, Revitzer and Taylor (1995) build on the sharking model of Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) and show that the increase in minimum wage may raise the employment rate.
9I assume that the low-wage job worker does not shirk, because the rm utilizes monitoring technology
perfectly in contrast with the high wage job.
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by the worker's eort, and its functional form is
e =

w1   x
x

; 0 <  < 1; (2)
where w1 is a real wage and x is reference point that equals a reservation wage (See below
in detail). Equation (2) shows that an increase in wage margin from the reservation wage
raises productivity. The rm chooses the level of real wage that minimize cost per unit
of the eective labor input, w1=e, which is modeled by Summers (1988). The optimal
real wage and eort level are
w1 =
x
1   ; (3)
e =


1  

: (4)
The rm is a price taker and sells the nal goods at a price P competitively. When
they can sell all the output under the exisiting levels of wages and price, employment are
determined so that marginal products of each labor equal to their costs. The optimal
conditions are
ea (en1)
a 1 nb2 = w1; (5)
b (en1)
a nb 12 = w2; (6)
where w2 is a real wage of low-wage workers. I refer to this economy as supply-side (non-
demand-shortage) regime because the output and employment level are determined by
not demand-side factors but supply-side factors.
On the other hand, when the rm is not be able to sell its notional output under
the exisiting levels of wages and price, the rm chooses optimal employment subject to
aggregate demand constraint as follows.
max
n1;n2
y   w1n1   w2n2
s:t: y = (en1)
a nb2; y = y
d;
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where yd is aggregate demand. The optimal conditions are10
(en1)
a nb2 = y
d; (7)
an2
bn1
=
w1
w2
: (8)
In (7) and (8), the marginal products of each labor is higher than its cost because
rm faces the limiting aggregate demand. This setting is formulated by Barro and
Grossman (1971). I refer to this economy as demand-shortage regime. The employment
level detemined by the rm under demand shortage regime is smaller than that under
supply-side regime.
2.2 Wage determination and employment
The rm's setting of eciency wage depends on the reservation wage x as in (3),
which equals to the worker's expectation wage when he/she loses the present job.11
x = n1w1 + n2w2: (9)
Substituting (9) into (3) yields
w1 =
n2w2
1     n1 : (10)
I assume  < 1   n1 to assure the existence of a solution. Equation (10) predicts that
the circumstances of the labor market aect the wage of high-wage job workers. The
increase in w2, n1, and n2 raise the reservation wage and the wage of the high-wage job
workers.
Using (10), (5) and (6), the equilibrium employment for each type of labor in the
supply-side regime economy become
n1 =
a(1  )
a+ b
 ns1 ; (11)
10As is shown by Ono (2001), the demand shortage arises not due to price rigidity but due to house-
holds' preference. The rm knows that the demand shortage cannot be eliminated in spite of price
adjustments. Thereby the rm maxmizes their prots given the constraint of demand shortage. The
optimal condition of the problem can be written by the Lagrangian multiplier method as follows:
max
n1;n2;
L = (en1)
a nb2   w1n1   w2n2 + ((en1)a nb2   yd)
The optimal conditions are
(1 + )ea (en1)
a 1 nb2 = w1;
(1 + )b (en1)
a nb 12 = w2;???
(en1)
a nb2   yd = 0:
11Falk, Kehr, and Zehnder (2006) show minimum wages have signicant eects on reservation wages
with a laboratory experiment.
6
n2 =

b
w2
 1
1 b

ea(1  )
a+ b
 a
1 b  ns2 (w2);
dns2
dw2
= ns2
0(w2) < 0: (12)
The increase in minimum wage reduces the employment ns2 but does not aect the
employment ns1 .12 This implies that the employment is determined by only the labor
market variable. Substituting equilibrium employment level (11) and (12) into produc-
tion function (1) gives aggregate output level:
y = (ens1 )
a (ns2 (w2))
b  ys(w2); dy
s
dw2
< 0: (13)
On the contrary, aggregate demand aects the employment Under demand shortage.
This relation is derived from (10), (7) and (8) as follows.
n1 =
a(1  )
a+ b
; (14)
n2 =

yd
 1
b

ea(1  )
a+ b
 a
b
: (15)
2.3 Households
Innitely lived households have a utility function of the form
U =
Z 1
0
e t [u(c) + v(m)] dt; (16)
where  is a constant rate of time preference, and u(c) and v(m) are a continuous concave
instantaneous utilities of real consumption c and real money balances m, respectively.
I abbreviate the time notation of each variable to simplify exposition. The households
provide one unit of labor inelastically. Population size in a economy is equal to 1. The
households are ex ante identical, and the allocation of their labor to high-wage or low-
wage jobs is done through a lottery. The households are then divided into two types
by their employment status, with each type having dierent budget constraints. One
engages in the high-wage job that receives the eciency wage w1, and the other engages
in the low-wage job that receives the minimum wage w2.
Each household chooses the optimal consumption and the real money balances to
maximize U , subject to the following ow budget constraint:
_m1 = w1 +
q
n1
  z1   c1   m1; (i = 1); (17)
12This is because the model assumes the Cobb-Dougulas production function.
@ns1
@w2
> 0 when
f22n2
f2
  f12n2
f1
+ 1 > 0 with concave non-homothetic production function f(n1; n2(w2)) or elasticity
of substitution is more than 1 with CES production function, where fj  @f(n1;n2)@nj ; (j = 1; 2) and
fjk =
@fj(n1;n2)
@nk
; (k = 1; 2). I do not consider this case because this paper focuses on the other eects
of minimum wage.
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_m2 = w2   z2   c2   m2; (i = 2): (18)
Variables such as c, m, n, w, and ; z are denoted by sux i = 1 if he/she has the high-
wage job, and i = 2 for the low-wage job.13 zi( 0) is a lump-sum tax. I assume that a
rm's real prot, q  (en1)a nb2 w1n1 w2n2, is equally distributed to the households of
high-wage job.14  is a ination rate. Then, the rst-order conditions of each household
are
ci
_ci
ci
=
v0(mi)
u0(ci)
    ; (i = 1; 2); (19)
where ci   u
00(ci)ci
u0(ci) > 0. The transversality conditions are
lim
t!1i(t)mi(t)e
 t = 0; (i = 1; 2); (20)
where i(t) is a costate variable of mi.
At any point in time, the money market is in equilibrium.
ms = n1m1 + n2m2; (21)
where ms indicates the real money stock. The percentage change in the money stock
depends on the government's money expansion rate,   _MsMs , and the ination rate, .
_ms
ms
=   : (22)
Gorvernment spending g is nanced by monetary expansion and households' taxation.
Therefore, the government's budget constraint is
g = ms+ n1z1 + n2z2; (23)
where ms = M
s
P
_Ms
Ms .
The aggregate demand consists of the consumption of households and the gorvernment
spending.
yd = c1n1 + c2n2 + g: (24)
In the same manner as Ono(2001), the rate of change of prices depends on gap between
13The behavior of unemployed people is not considered in the model. That is, the model assumes
implicitly that unemployed people are parasites on their friends or relations who have a job.
14This assumption is for the simplicity. Meanwhile, it is possible to build in the stock market, in
which case the rm's prots are wholly distributed as dividends. This setting makes the model tangled
because it needs to endogenize a rate of prot return or stock price.
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aggregate supply and demand.
 = 
"
yd
ys(w2)
  1
#
;  > 0; (25)
where  denotes the ination rate and  stands for the adjustment speed of the price.
Excess demand (supply) pushes up (down) the ination rate.
2.4 Equilibria
The system of consolidated equations is shown as follows.
_c1 =
c1
c1
"
v0(m1)
u0(c1)
    
 
yd
ys(w2)
  1
!#
; (26)
_c2 =
c2
c2
"
v0(m2)
u0(c2)
    
 
yd
ys(w2)
  1
!#
; (27)
_m1 =
(en1)
a (n2)
b   w2n2
n1
  z1   c1   
 
yd
ys(w2)
  1
!
m1; (28)
_m2 = w2   z2   c2   
 
yd
ys(w2)
  1
!
m2; (29)
yd = c1n1 + c2n2 + g; (30)
where (30) is derived from equation (23) in which I assume  = 0. Equations (26)-
(29) form an autonomous dynamic system with respect to c1; c2;m1 and m2 under the
equation (30), exogeneous minimum wage w2, the output level y
s(w2) in (13), and
the predetermined variables n1 and n2 which are determined in (11) and (12) under
non-demand shortage meanwhile in (14) and (15) under demand shortage.
To show the eect of minimum wage on economy clearly, I focus two steady state
equilibria such that
_c1 = 0; _c2 = 0; _m1 = 0; _m2 = 0;  = 0; (31)
which is called supply-side regime equilibrium and,
_c1 = 0; _c2 = 0; _m1 =  m
s
n1
; _m2 = 0;  < 0; (32)
which is called demand-shortage regime equilibrium. The steady state in (32) entails
persisting deation  < 0 by supposing an addition assumption as explained below.
In the next section the supply-side regime equilibrium is analyzed, and after that, the
demand-shortage regime equilibrium is analyzed.
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3 Minimum wage eects in supply-side regime equilibrium
The system (26)-(30) reaches to a steady state equilibrium as represented in (31)
when the stability conditions (Assumption 1 in Appendix) are satised. This is shown in
Appendix. In this steady state, consumption and real money balances of each household
become constant, the gap between aggregate supply and demand is plugged, that is,
 = 0, and the employment rate of each job is determined by (11) and (12). The steady
state equilibrium values are obtained (see Appendix A.2) as follows:
csi = c
s
i (w2);
dcs1
dw2
< 0;
dcs2
dw2
= sign(1 +ms1 
s
c1 +m
s
2 
s
c1
ns2
ns1
 ms2 sw2); (33)
msi = m
s
i (w2);
dms1
dw2
< 0;
dms2
dw2
= sign(1 +ms1 
s
c1 +m
s
2 
s
c1
ns2
ns1
 ms2 sw2); (34)
where the superscript s indicates the equilibrium value. The increase in the minimum
wage entails an overall wage rise, and which aects consumption and money holdings
through each household's budget and the ination rate. In the steady state equilibrium,
the increase in the minimum wage reduces the consumption and money balances of
high-wage job households cs1 and ms1 , because it is mainly aected by the decreases in
real income which consists of their wages and distributed income from prot.15
But it may raise the cs2 ;ms2 when the eect of sw2 in (33) and (34) is small enough
because it is aected by the increase in real income which is just caused by the minimum
wage hike. On the whole, the minimum wage hike lowers the aggregate consumption
level, that is,
d(cs1 n
s
1 +c
s
2 n
s
2 )
dw2
< 0, which entails a decrease in aggregate output level,
because the negative eects of cs1 and ns2 dominates the eects of cs2 . This result is
summed up as follows.
Proposition 1 In supply-side regime equilibrium, a minimum wage hike reduces the
total consumption and aggregate output level.
Further, unemployment rate in the supply-side regime equilibrium can be expressed
as us = 1 ns1  ns2 (w2) where dn
s
2 (w2)
dw2
< 0 and ns1 is determined by deep parameters.
Therefore the minimum wage hike leads to the increase in unemployment rate. This is
shown as in Proposition 2:16
Proposition 2 In supply side regime equilibrium, a minimum wage hike raises an un-
employment rate.
15The real income of household 1 is w1 +
q1
n1
=
ys(ws2 ) w2ns2
ns
1
.
16 @us
@w2
> 0 when f22n2
f2
  f12n2
f1
+ 1 + f11n1
f1
  f21n1
f2
  n1
1  n1 > 0 with a concave non-homothetic
production function or elasticity of substitution  with CES production function satises 2

> 1  n1
1  n1 .
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Moreover, social welfare V s can be expressed as
V s =
Z 1
0
ns1 (u(c
s
1 ) + v(m
s
1 )) e
 tdt+
Z 1
0
ns2 (u(c
s
2 ) + v(m
s
2 )) e
 tdt
=
1

[ns1 (u(c
s
1 ) + v(m
s
1 )) + n
s
2 (u(c
s
2 ) + v(m
s
2 ))] : (35)
Dierentiating (35) with minimum wage w2 through c
s
i ;m
s
i ; (i = 1; 2); n
s
2 , Proposition
3 is obtained (see Appendix).
Proposition 3 In supply-side regime equilibrium, a minimum wage hike reduces the
social welfare if
" >
 1
dcs1
dw2
ns1

dcs1
dw2
ns1 +
dcs2
dw2
ns2

u0(cs2 ) + 
u00(cs2 )
v00(ms2 )

+
dns2
dw2
(u(cs2 ) + v(m
s
2 ))

:
Where " indicates a subtraction u0(cs2 )+ 
u00(cs2 )
v00(ms2 )
from u0(cs1 )+ 
u00(cs1 )
v00(ms1 )
. If " is higher
than a certain negative value as in Proposition 3, the ambiguous eects of minimum
wage hike on consumption cs2 in (33) and money balances ms2 in (34) become lower
than the total decreasing eects on cs1 and ms1 , and then the minimum wage hike
reduces the social welfare. For example when " = 0, the social welfare deteriorates by
the minimum wage hike.
4 Minimum wage eects in demand-shortage regime equi-
librium
Demand shortage regime equilibrium with deation represented in (32) can be gener-
ated by supposing an additional assumption of money utility. In the supply-side regime
economy, I assume implicitly that the marginal utility of money converges to zero as the
households increase their real money balances, that is, limmi!1 v0(mi) = 0; (i = 1; 2).
Here, the marginal utility of money of high-wage households is assumed to be insatiable
which is assumed by Ono (2001). This assumption emphasize a role of money holding
which generate not only transaction motive but also social power, status and prestages.17
Assumption of marginal utility of money
lim
m1!1
v0(m1) =  > 0; (36)
17Ono, Ogawa and Yoshida (2004) show empirically that the marginal rate of substitution of con-
sumption for money has a strictly positive lower bound. This result implies that the marginal utility of
money will will be insatiable.
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The lower bound  of marginal utility is coming up as the high-wage job households
increase money holdings. This assumption transforms the Euler equation (26) into
c1
_c1
c1
=
8<:
v0(m1)
u0(c1)     ; m1 is not big enough;

u0(c1)     ; m1 is big enough:
(37)
When money holding increases marginally, the present consumption increases in re-
sponse to the decreasing marginal utility of money in the steady state equilibrium of
the rst equation of (37), but the present consumption does not respond in the second
equation of (37). This invokes a demand shortage and deation, even if the price adjusts
a disequilibrium of demand and supply in the goods market as in (25).
From (15), (27)-(30), and (37), the steady state equilibrium in (32) can be expressed
as consolidated two equations.
yd = c1(y
d; w2)n1 + c2(y
d; w2)n2 + g; (38)
n2 =

yd
 1
b

ea(1  )
a+ b
 a
b
; (39)
where Appendix shows the saddle stability conditions of this equilibrium and explains
the derivation of (38). (38) indicates the aggregate demand in response to employ-
ment n2 which is depicted as a upward-sloping line AD in Fig.1. (39) represents the
relationship between aggregate output level and employment n2, i.e., the employment
determination equation through the production function when rms face the demand
shortage. This diagram is similar to the so-called Keynesian cross implying aggregate
demand determines aggregate output. E1 is demand shortage regime equilibrium given
a constant minimum wage w2.
As minimum wage increases, the AD line moves to upper direction and the steady
state equilibrium shifts from E1 to E
0
1. This increases the equilibrium aggregate demand
yd and employment n2 and thus the unemployment rate falls down. At this moment the
deation becomes milder by reaction of the shrinking gap between aggregate demand
yd and potential aggregate output ys(w2) which is caused by the increase in yd and the
decrease in ys(w2). In this process, the rising ination rates raises the consumption
c1 in (37). At the same time, the minimum wage hike also raises a real income of
household 2 and their consumption. In respose to the increase in the total consumption
and aggregate demand, the rm increases the employment.18 These results are summed
18In the initial steady state before the government raises the minimum wage. The government set the
nominal minimum wage in proportion to the ination rate as same as a indexation wage. To implement
a minimum wage hike policy, the government raises the nominal minimum wage level transiently. At this
moment, the economy goes to the new steady state equilibrium as the government sets the minimum
12
n2
yd
AD (38)
OE (39)
E1
E01
A
Fig 1: Determination of employment and aggregate demand
up in Proposition 4 and 5.
Proposition 4 In demand-shortage regime equilibrium, a minimum wage hike raises
aggregate demand, total consumption and employment, and also alleviates dea-
tion.
Proposition 5 In demand-shortage regime equilibrium, a minimum wage hike decreases
unemployment rates.
Incidentally in point A, the aggregate demand AD becomes tangential to the produc-
tion function OE in which the point that the aggregate demand yd equals aggregate
output ys(w2). To prove this fact, in equilibrium A, it require to show that the slope of
aggregate demand AD is just wA2 refered to the minimum wage in equilibrium A. The
budget constraint in (29) becomes c2 = w
A
2   z2 under ination rate  = 0 and then,
the AD equation (38) is yd = (c1 + z1)n1 + w
A
2 n2. The slope of this line becomes just
w2.
dyd
dn2
= wA2 .
19
On the other hand, in the steady state equilibrium of supply side regime, the employ-
ment rate ns2 (wA2 ) is determined by (12) and the marginal productivity of n2 equals
to wA2 . This implies that in point A the production function has the tangent line that
slopes equals to wA2 . Thus the employment level n2 under demand shortage in A is just
wage in proportion to the ination rate that is higher than initial steady state. Note that in the new
steady state equilibrium, the ination rate becomes higher.
19Substituting c2 = w2   z2 into aggregate demand yields yd = (c1 + z1)n1 +w2n2, where c1 in point
A does not depend on ination rate pi = 0.
13
equals to ns2 (wA2 ), and then the aggregate demand yd equals to the aggregate output
ys(wA2 ).
Proposition 6 When minimum wage have increased and the equilibrium has reached
to point A, the supply and demand gap has disappeared and then ination rate 
has become zero. In this point the demand shortage regimes alters to supply side
regime.
In analogy with (35), social welfare in the demand-shortage regime equilibrium V d
can be expressed as
V d =
1

h
nd1 u(c
d
1 ) + n
d
2 u(c
d
2 ) + n
d
2 v(m
d
2 )
i
+ nd1
"
v(m1(0))

  (m1(0)n
d
1 +m
d
2n
d
2 )
(+ )nd1
#
;(40)
where the superscript d means the equilibrium value in equilibrium (32), m1(0) indi-
cates the initial (t = 0) money holding of high-wage job households and its amount m1
is increasing in this equilibrium as follows
_m1 =  m
sd
nd1
> 0: (41)
The transverserity condition is satised even under (41) as shown in Appendix. The last
term of (40) is derived from
R1
0 n1v(m1)e
 tdt, which is also presented in Appendix.
Because cd1 ; cd2 ; nd2 , and md2 are increasing functions of w2, a minimum wage hike
raise the rst parenthesis and the rst term of the second parenthesis in (40). However,
the eect of the the minimum wage on the last term becomes ambiguous. Dierentiating
the last term in (40) with w2 gives
d

 (m1(0)nd1 +md2 nd2 )d
(+d)

dw2
=
d(m1(0)n
d
1 +m
d
2 n
d
2 )
dw2
 
 d
(+ d)
!
+
dd
dw2

(+ d)2
"
 (m1(0)nd1 +md2 nd2 )

#
; (42)
where d < 0. The rst term of (42) becomes positive, However, the second term
becomes negative. Assumption 3 (in Appendix) gives rise to the smaller second term
eect than the other minimum wage eects. It gives the following Proposition.
Proposition 7 In the demand-shortage regime economy, a minimum wage hike im-
proves the social welfare.
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5 Discussion
5.1 Optimal minimum wage
What is the optimal minimum wage policy in this context? To answer this question,
concepts of natural rate of unemployment rate and actual unemployment rate should be
made clear. The natural rate of unemployment has been discussed thoroughly among
macroeconomists. Friedman(1968 p8) explains that it \is the level that would be ground
out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided there is imbed-
ded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets,
including market imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies,  ". In
the supply-side regime equilibrium in (31), the unemployment rate is just determined by
the dynamic Walrasian system including market imperfections such as eciency wage
and minimum wage.20 Thereby the unemployment rate us(= 1   ns1   ns2 ) can be
regarded as the natural unemployment rate.21 On the other hand, the unemployment
rate in the demand-shortage regime equilibrium is not determined by the Walrasian
system in the sense that the price adjustment will not be functioned perfectly to plug
the demand-supply gap.
w2
1  u
Full employment
A
Ew
E
2
wA2
B
1  uE
NU
UU
1  uB
1  uA
wA
0
2
A0
1  uA0
Fig 2: Unemployment rate and minimum wage
As shown above, a minimum wage hike has good or bad eects on unemployment rate
and social welfare as shown in Proposition 2, 3, 5 and 7. Fig.2 indicates the relationship
20Blanchard and Kats (1997) explain that the natural rate of unemployment is determined by the
intersection of demand wage relation (which is assumed to rm's labor demand curve) and supply wage
relation (which is assumed to wage setting curve by eciency wage or bargaining between rm and labor
union).
21As the supply-side regime equilibrium in (31) stays at zero deation rate, the unemployment rate of
this equilibrium can be regarded as what we call NAIRU (non-accelerating ination rate of unemploy-
ment). Ball and Mankiw (2001) explain this concept as \the unemployment rate at which ination will
be stable, absent the high-frequency shocks   ".
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between minimum wage level and unemployment rate. NU curves represents the natural
unemployment rates given by the minimum wage. UU curves represent the unemploy-
ment rate u (= 1   n1   n2) determined by the demand-shortage regime equilibrium.
When minimum wage level is wE2 , the general equilibrium of demand shortage regime
is at E (which is the same point E in Fig.1 ) and its unemployment rate becomes uE .
At the same time, the natural unemployment rate is uB, although uB is not realized
because the economy faces the demand shortage.22 At this equilibrium E, policy direc-
tor should increase the minimum wage to wA2 . It decreases the unemployment rate from
uE to uA and the economy moves to the equilibrium A (which is the same point A in
Fig.1). This policy can also improve social welfare as shown in proposition 7.
The policy director should not increase the minimum wage so high beyond wA2 . Equi-
librium A is not the demand shortage regime any more but the supply side-regime. If the
policy director misjudges the economic situation and increases the minimum wage from
wA2 to w
A0
2 , the unemployment rate will go up to u
A0 with social welfare deteriorating.
What happens when the policy director decreases the minimum wage from wA2 to w
E
2
in the equilibrium A? If no economic shocks happen at this moment, the economy will
get trap to demand-shortage regime and the unemployment rate will fall down to uE
rather than to uB. Therefore the policy director should set the optimal minimum wage
so that the demand shortage disappears.
5.2 Deation and minimum wage
After the global nancial crisis in 2008, the monetary authority of various countries
has kept interests zero lower bound and many governments have increased the spending.
Despite a broad range of measures to overcome the depression, the deationary concerns
does not relieved especially in EU and Japan.
The minimum wage hike is the better policy when the government spending is re-
stricted by its debt limit. The minimum wage hike does not entail any costs, and it is
no danger of budget constraint. In our model, as the economy moves from the equilib-
rium E to A with the increasing minimum wage, the consumption and employment also
increases and deation makes better indeed. That's why a minimum wage hike can be
helpful policy in getting rid of deation and stagnation.
22Blanchard and Katz (1997) argue that the increase in the reservation wage shifts up the \supply
wage relation" and raises the natural rate of unemployment as same as the result in Proposition 2. Their
study also points out that when the increase in the reservation wage is proportion to the productivity
growth, the natural rate of unemployment remains constant.
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6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the role of a minimum wage in macroeconomics with dynamic
general equilibrium model giving rise to two dierent equilibria. The study demon-
strates that a minimum wage hike has positive eects on an employment rate, aggregate
consumption, and social welfare under a demand shortage economy whereas does not
under a non-demand shortage economy. In other words there is an optimal minimum
wage level that dissolves a demand shortage in macro economy. In this regard, Manning
argues that there is some level of the minimum wage at which employment will decline
signicantly and the literature should re-orient itself towards trying to nd that point.
Our theoretical nding implies that the policy director can improve the aggregate eco-
nomic activity by the increase in the minimum wage without any government spending.
However, the increase in the minimum wage may entails the unfavorable side eects that
the natural rate of unemployment rate goes up. As for countries that faces the demand
shortage or diminishing price pressure, the minimum wage policy can be considered as
one of the eective option to stimulate economic activity.
To consider the more realistic minimum wage policy, the extension of incorporating
the productivity growth rate may be desirable. Productivity growth aects the natural
unemployment rate, the potential output level, the ination rate and the wage growth
rate. Under this situation, the growth rate of minimum wage as a policy tool should be
examined.
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A Appendix
A.1 Appendix 1 Saddle stability under the supply-side regime in (31)
In order to derive the saddle stability conditions, I rst show relations between vari-
ables, the ination rate , consumption ci and minimum wage w2.
The ination rate under non-demand shortage becomes
s = 

c1n
s
1 + c2n
s
2 (w2) + g
ys(w2)
  1

; (43)
sci 
@s
@ci
=
nsi
ys
> 0; sw2 
@s
@w2
= Sign

(c2   w2) n
s
2
0(w2)w2
ys

> 0;
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where I have used (11), (12), (24), and (25). Equation (29) in the steady state gives
c2   w2 < 0. On the other hand (14), (15), (24), and (25) give the ination rate under
the demand shortage:
d(c1; c2; w2) = 
"
c1n
d
1 + c2n
d
2(c1; c2) + g
ys(w2)
  1
#
; dci 
@d
@ci
> 0; dw2 
@d
@w2
> 0:(44)
d is expressed as a positive function of c1, c2, and w2 because the employment is
determined from (14), (15) and (24) as follows.
nd1 =
a(1  )
a+ b
 nd1 ; (45)
nd2 = n
d
2(c1; c2); n2c1 =
@n2
@ci
=
cini
@((en1)
anb2)
@n2
  c2
> 0; (46)
where
@((en1)
anb2)
@n2
  c2 > w2   c2 = z2 + _m2 + m2 > 0 because marginal product of n2
is higher than w2 because of the demand-shortage. Note that the employment rate of
high-wage job nd1 is constant as is equals ns1 ; whereas the employment rate of low-wage
job nd2 depends not on wage but on consumption of each household, and is signicantly
less than ns2 because rms faces the aggregate demand constraint.
(43) and (44) leads to the general form of ination rate.
 = (c1; c2; w2); ci > 0; w2 > 0: (47)
A.1.1 Supply side regime equilibrium in (31) of the stability conditions
Using (47), I next show the local saddle stability conditions of the dynamics described
by (26)-(29). Linearizing these equations in the neighborhood of the steady state values
ci ;mi (i = 1; 2) (which is expressed as superscript s in the text) in (31) gives26666664
_c1
_c2
_m1
_m2
37777775 =
266666664
+    c1c1c1  
c1c2
c1
 v00(m1)u00(c1) 0
  c2c1c2 +   
c2c2
c2
0  v00(m2)u00(c2)
 m1c1   1  m1c2   0
 m2c1  m2c2   1 0  
377777775
26666664
c1   c1
c2   c2
m1  m1
m2  m2
37777775 (48)
Noting that,
@

v0(m1)
u0(c
1
)c1

@c1
=
 u00(c1)v0(m1)
(u0(c1))2c1
=
v0(m1)
u0(c1)c

1
= +

c1
because I assume ci =
 u00(ci )ci
u0(ci )
does not depend on ci . While the real consumption c1 and c2 are jumpable
variables at any point in time, the real money balances m1 and m2 are state valiables.
For a stable saddle point in equilibrium, it must have two positive roots (or a pair of
complex roots with a positive real part) and two negative real roots (or a pair of complex
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roots with a negative real part).
Denoting the Jacobian matrix in (53) as As, the charactoristic equation can be ex-
pressed as
4s   Trace (As)3s +Bs2s   Css + det (As) = 0;
where sk; (k = 1; 2; 3; 4) is the roots of this equation and
Bs = 2   

c1c1
c1
+
c2c2
c2

  v
00(m1)
u00(c1)
(1 +m1c1) 
v00(m2)
u00(c2)
(1 +m2c2) ;
det (As) =

v00(m1)
u00(c1)
2 v00(m2)
u00(c2)
2
(1 +m1c1 +m

2c2) > 0: (49)
Note  = 0 in the supply side regime equilibrium. If the following conditions are satised
at least, the system has a locally stable saddle point.23
s1s2s3s4 > 0; (50)
s1s2 + s1s3 + s1s4 + s2s3 + s2s4 + s3s4 < 0: (51)
Considering the relation rule between roots and coecients of the eigenvalue equation,
the LHS of (50) and (51) equal det (As) and Bs, respectively. (50) is satised already
without additional conditions as in (49). The condition Bs < 0 is satised under the
following assumption.
Assumption 1
 

c1c1
c1
+
c2c2
c2

< 0 (52)
A.1.2 Demand shortage regime equilibrium in (32) of the stability condi-
tions
The system of demand shortage regime equilibrium is described by (27)-(29) and
(37). I show here that this dynamic system has a saddle path to the steady state
in (32). Linearizing these equations in the neighborhood of the steady state values
cdi ;mdi (i = 1; 2) in (31) give26666664
_c1
_c2
_m1
_m2
37777775 =
266666664
+    cd1 c1c1  
cd1 c2
c1
0 0
  cd2 c1c2 +   
cd2 c2
c2
0  v00(m2)u00(c2)
 md1 c1   1  md1 c2   0
 md2 c1  md2 c2   1 0  
377777775
26666664
c1   cd1
c2   cd2
m1  md1
m2  md2
37777775 (53)
23Buiter (1984) discusses saddle-path stability in dynamic general equilibrium model with continuous
time model.
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Denoting the Jacobian matrix in (53) as Ad, the charactoristic equation can be ex-
pressed as
4d   Trace

Ad

3d +B
d2d   Cdd + det

Ad

= 0;
where dk; (k = 1; 2; 3; 4) is the roots of this equation and
Bd = (   )
 
cd1 c1
c1
+
cd2 c2
c2
  
!
  (+ )  v
00(md2 )
u00(cd2 )

1 +md2 c2

; (54)
det

Ad

=  c
d
1 c1
c1
 
v00(md2 )
u00(cd2 )
!
+2 (+ )
" 
v00(md2 )
u00(cd2 )
!
  (+ ) +
 
cd1 c1
c1
+
cd2 c2
c2
!#
: (55)
The saddle stability conditions require Bd < 0 and det(Ad) > 0. To assure this condi-
tions, I assume Assumption 2 in addition to Assumption 1.
Assumption 2
(+ ) +
v00(md2 )
u00(cd2 )
> 0: (56)
Noting that  < 0 and +  > 0 in the neighborhood of the equilibrium, Assumption 1
makes the big bracket in (55) positive and then det(A) > 0 is obtained under Assumption
1 substituted cdi for ci . Further Assumption 2 makes the second and third term of (54)
negative. At the same time Assumption 1 gives the rst term of (54) negative. Therefore
Bd < 0 is obtained under Assumption 1 and 2.
A.2 Appendix 2 Derivations of (33) and (34)
Using the Cramer's rule in the steady state equilibrium, (33) is
dc1
dw2
=
1
det (As)
v00(m1)
u00(c1)
v00(m2)
u00(c2)

 m1c2   (1 +m2c2)
ns2
ns1
 m1w2

< 0;
dc2
dw2
=
1
det (As)
v00(m1)
u00(c1)
v00(m2)
u00(c2)

1 +m1c1 +m

2c1
ns2
ns1
 m2w2

;
where det (As) > 0 obtained by the stability condition. Further, the eect of a minimum
wage hike on aggregate consumption is
d(ns1c

1 + n
s
2c

2)
dw2
=
dc1
dw2
ns1 +
dns1
dw2
c1 +
dc2
dw2
ns2 +
dns2
dw2
c2
=
1
det (As)
v00(m1)
u00(c1)
v00(m2)
u00(c2)

 m1ns1w2  m2ns2w2 +
dns2
dw2
c2

< 0;
where
dns1
dw2
= 0 and
dns2
dw2
< 0 as shown in (11) and (12). I have used ci =
 ni
ys .
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Dierentiating the steady state equilibrium condition
v0(mi )
u0(ci )
=  with w2 yields
u00(ci )c

i
u0(ci )
dci
dw2
w2
ci
=
v00(mi )m

i
v0(mi )
dmi
dw2
w2
mi
, and then
dmi
dw2
=
u00(ci )
v00(mi )
dci
dw2
:
A.3 Appendix 3 Proof of Proposition 2
In the steady state equilibrium of (31), dierentiating (35) with w2 yields
dV s
dw2
=
1


u0(c1)
dc1
dw2
ns1 + v
0(m1)
dm1
dw2
ns1 + u
0(cs2)
dc2
dw2
ns2 + v
0(m2)
dm2
dw2
ns2 +
dns2
dw2
(u(c2) + v(m

2))

=
1


dc1
dw2
ns1

u0(c1) + 
u00(c1)
v00(m1)

+
dc2
dw2
ns2

u0(c2) + 
u00(c2)
v00(m2)

+
dns2
dw2
(u(c2) + v(m

2))

:
Dening u0(c1) + 
u00(c1)
v00(m1)
= u0(c2) + 
u00(c2)
v00(m2)
+ " yields
dV s
dw2
=
1


dc1
dw2
ns1 +
dc2
dw2
ns2

u0(c2) + 
u00(c2)
v00(m2)

+ "
dc1
dw2
ns1 +
dns2
dw2
(u(c2) + v(m

2))

:
Noting that
dc1
dw2
ns1 +
dc2
dw2
ns2 =
1
det(As)
v00(m1)
u00(c1)
v00(m2)
u00(c2)
[ m1ns1w2  m2ns2w2 ] < 0, the con-
dition of dV
s
dw2
< 0 is given by
" >
 1
dc1
dw2
ns1

dc1
dw2
ns1 +
dc2
dw2
ns2

u0(c2) + 
u00(c2)
v00(m2)

+
dns2
dw2
(u(c2) + v(m

2))

:
A.4 Appendix 4. Deviations of (38), (39) and equilibrium value in
demand-shortage regime
In the steady state equilibrium of (32), total dierentials of (27) and (29) give
(+ )u00(c2)dc2   v00(m2)dm2 + u0(c2)d = 0; (57)
dc2 + dm2 +m2d   dw2 = 0: (58)
Substituting (58) into (57) yields

(+ )u00(c2) + v00(m2)

dc2 = v
00(m2)dw2  

m2v
00(m2) + u0(c2)

d; (59)
(+ )u00(c2) + v00(m2)

dm2 = (+ )u
00(c2)dw2 +
 (+ )m2u00(c2) + u0(c2) d: (60)
(59) and (60) represent that consumption c2 and money holdings m2 depend on mini-
mum wage w2 and ination rate. A minimum wage hike increases income but an increase
in ination rate decreases the value of money holding and the income.
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In addition, total dierential of (37) gives
(+ )u00(c1)dc1 =  u0(c1)d: (61)
Further, ination rate (25) can be dierentiated as follows.
d =

ys(w2)
dyd   y
d
(ys(w2))2
@ys
@w2
dw2: (62)
Substituting (62) into (59) (60) and (61) yields
(+ )u00(c1)dc1 = u0(c1)

yd
(ys(w2))2
@ys
@w2
dw2   
ys(w2)
dyd

; (63)
[(+ )u00(c2) + v00(m2)] dc2 =

v00(m2) + (m2v00(m2) + u0(c2))
yd
(ys(w2))2
@ys
@w2

dw2
  [m2v00(m2) + u0(c2)] 
ys(w2)
dyd; (64)
[(+ )u00(c2) + v00(m2)] dm2 =

(+ )u00(c2)  ( (+ )m2u00(c2) + u0(c2)) y
d
(ys(w2))2
@ys
@w2

dw2
+ [ (+ )m2u00(c2) + u0(c2)] 
ys(w2)
dyd: (65)
The assumption 2 assures that the square brackets in left-hand side of (64) and (65)
become both negative.24
In right hand side of both (64) and (65), the cocient in big bracket of terms dw2 are
inuenced by two eects direct minimum wage eect (the rst term) and the indirect
eect through the ination (the second term). I assume that the direct eect is larger
than the indirect eect (Assumption 3). This assumption implies that wage or income
is more important factor than ination rate when households choose cosumption and
money holding.
Assumption 3
v00(m2) +
 
m2v
00(m2) + u0(c2)
 yd
(ys(w2))2
@ys
@w2
< 0; (66)
(+ )u00(c2) 
  (+ )m2u00(c2) + u0(c2) yd
(ys(w2))2
@ys
@w2
< 0: (67)
Equations (63)-(65) and Assumption 3 give the
c1 = c1(y
d; w2);
@c1
@yd
> 0;
@c1
@w2
> 0; (68)
c2 = c2(y
d; w2);
@c2
@yd
> 0;
@c2
@w2
> 0; (69)
m2 = m2(y
d; w2);
@m2
@yd
> 0;
@m2
@w2
> 0: (70)
24Multiplying both terms of the assumption 2 by u00(c2) yields ( + )u00(c2) + v00(m2) < 0. Note
u00(c2) < 0.
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(68)-(70) generate the AD line in (38) which dierential coecient of n2, y
d and w2 is
1  n1 @c1
@yd
  n2 @c2
@yd

dyd = c2dn2 +

n1
@c1
@w2
+ n2
@c2
@w2

dw2: (71)
The marginal increment in yd gives rise to the increase in c1 and c2 through the ination
eect in (25). This ination eects must not be so large in demand shortage equilib-
rium. If this eects is too large, aggregate demand runs short to satisfy this increasing
consumption, this genrates the further ination. In this process the ination accerates
more and more and steady state equilibrium collapses. To rule out this scenario, it
requires following assumption.
Assumption 4
1  n1 @c1
@yd
  n2 @c2
@yd
> 0: (72)
Equations (71) and (72) show that the aggregate demand yd becomes a increasing func-
tion of w2 as also shown in Fig.1. Thereby equations (68)-(70) give conclusions that
minimum wage hikes has positive eects on c1, c2 and m2 in the steady state general
equilibrium under demand-shortage regime.
A.5 Appendix 5 Derivation of (40)
In the steady state, m1 increases at defration rate  d and marginal utility of money
becomes constant . Taylor series expansion for v(m1(t)), evaluated at the steady state
equilibrium md1 = m1(0), as follows.
v(m1(t)) = v(m1(0)) + v
0(m1(0))[m1(t) m1(0)] + v00(m1(0))[m1(t) m1(0)]
= v(m1(0)) + [m1(t) m1(0)]: (73)
Using m1(t) =  n
d
2
nd1
md2 +

m1(0) +
nd2
nd1
md2

e dtand (73), the last term in (40) can
be derived as follows.Z 1
0
v(m1(t))e
 tdt =
Z 1
0
"
v(m1(0))  n
d
2
nd1
md2 + 
 
m1(0) +
nd2
nd1
md2
!
e 
dt   m1(0)
#
e tdt
=
1

"
v(m1(0))  n
d
2
nd1
md2   m1(0)
#
+

+ d
"
m1(0) +
nd2
nd1
md2
#
=
v(m1(0))

  
nd1 
h
nd1 m1(0) + n
d
2 m
d
2
i
+

nd1 (+ d)
h
nd1 m1(0) + n
d
2 m
d
2
i
=
v(m1(0))

  (n
d
1 m1(0) + n
d
2 m
d
2 )
nd1 (+ d)
"
d

#
:
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A.6 Appendix 6 Transversality conditon in demand-shortage regime
equilibrium
Under (41) in demand-shortage regime equilibrium, the transversality condition will
be satised as shown below. Considering _m2 = 0 in the steady state, time dierential
of the money market equilibrium (21) becomes
_ms = nd1 _m1: (74)
The gorvernment's money expansion rate is assumed to be zero in (22), and thereby
money stock increases at the deation (negative ination) rate, that is, _m
s
ms =  d.
Hence, the change in the money holdings of high-wage households (74) can be written
as (41), which can be rewritten as:
_m1(t) =  dm1   n
d
2
nd1
dmd2 ; (75)
Further, (75) can be solved using the steady state valuables as
m1(t) =  n
d
2
nd1
md2 +
"
m1(0) +
nd2
nd1
md2
#
e 
dt; (76)
where m1(0) indicates the initial (t = 0) money holding of high-wage job households.
Using (76), the LHS of the transversality condition (20) is
lim
t!11
"
 n
d
2
nd1
md2 +
 
m1(0) +
nd2
nd1
md2
!
e t
#
e t
= lim
t!1u
0(cd1 )
"
nd2
nd1
md2 e
 t +
 
m1(0) +
nd2
nd1
md2
!
e (+)t
#
: (77)
Since
nd2
nd1
md2 e t and

m1(0) +
nd2
nd1
md2

e (+d)t are monotonically decreasing as t!
1, transversality condition (20) converges to zero. Thus, the transversality condition
can be satised even under (41).
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